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Looking In or Looking Out? 
Top-down Change and Operational Capability 
Mark Lemon, John Craig & Matthew Cook  
Abstract: »Nach innen wenden oder das Aussen im Auge behalten? Top-down-
Veränderungsprozesse und operative Fähigkeiten«. Strategic intentions reflect 
the aspirations of an organization. They can also be translated into targets for 
the rest of the organization and structures, procedures, measures and associated 
rules introduced to meet them. Drawing upon insight from social systems the-
ory, and case study evidence from the telecommunications industry, this con-
ceptual paper suggests that the ensuing implementation processes can conflict 
with the principles and objectives of actors at operational levels and lead to be-
haviors that can hinder the pursuit of those high level goals. This misalign-
ment, or pathological autopoiesis, is manifest through a restructuring in which 
the organization becomes the environment for operational actors who in turn 
focus upon the “translation” of imposed conditions into their own psychic and 
social needs. In effect the organization turns in on itself and away from the 
need to acquire information about, and respond to, its own environment, a con-
dition that is fundamental to the resilience and survival of any system. 
Keywords: rules and measures; trust; autopoiesis. 
1. Introduction: From the Inside Looking In 
The view of organizations as static entities, waiting to be “done to,” is increas-
ingly questioned (HODGE & CORONADO, 2007). Whether we think of them 
as complex, irreversible and manifesting emergent characteristics (STACEY, 
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1996; CILLIERS, 1998; ALLEN, 2007), as the interaction and juxtaposition of 
multiple actors – human and otherwise (LAW, 1992 and 1994; LATOUR, 
1993) or as the recursive interaction of form and behavior (GIDDENS, 1984; 
BECK, GIDDENS & LASH, 1994; SCHNEIDEWIND & PETERSON, 1998) 
organizations are linked and co-evolutionary processes. In consequence they 
also defy a management approach that is based upon a linear transformation 
from the articulation of strategic aims to their operationalization. 
Martin GREN and Wolfgang ZIERHOFER (2003) follow LUHMANN’s 
(1995) observation that the contemporary industrial landscape has become one 
of increasing differentiation and restricted or specialized functionality in which 
each sub-system has its own codes and protocols. This reduction of function 
also means that the transformation of abstract, cross cutting and high level 
vision into action, is seldom smooth or aligned in the way that senior manage-
ment would choose. BEER and EISENSTAT (2000) suggest six key barriers or 
“silent killers” to the effective implementation of strategy, albeit it well con-
ceived. These reflect the difficulty of implementing change into emergent, 
multi-scalar systems and include top down senior management style, conflict-
ing priorities and poor communication and co-ordination within and between 
the organization’s functions. This broadly conceptual paper will suggest an 
additional barrier, namely the tendency of some rules and procedures, often 
driven by inappropriate performance measures and targets, to direct an organi-
zation’s attention inwards and away from its external environment. The envi-
ronment, or that over which the system – organization has no direct control, 
includes a set of economic forces associated with an industry, associated com-
petition and market conditions more generally. 
The paper will argue that the implementation of some procedures from the 
top-down, albeit in pursuit of consensual high level objectives, can result in a 
social restructuring at operational level that mitigates against the achievement 
of those high level aims – in the case example outlined below these aims are 
operational efficiency and enhanced customer satisfaction. This systemic re-
production or autopoiesis, will be seen as the emergent relationship between 
the receptivity of operational actors (JEFFREY & SEATON, 2004) and their 
willingness and ability to acquire information about the environment in which 
they operate. The resulting communication deficit provides an example of what 
GREGORY (2006) terms pathological autopoiesis and occurs between opera-
tional actors, between customers and those actors and thereby between custom-
ers and the organization. This process of mutually (un)informative and emer-
gent interaction, or structural coupling, highlights the distinction made by 
LEYDESDORFF (2000) between the transfer of information between actors 
and its communication to the organization. The ability of a system to respond 
to its external environment is key to its adaptive capability or resilience; this 
ability is in turn largely determined by the information about that environment 
and the communication of that information into the system. DEGELE (2008) 
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highlights the intentional aspect of control before suggesting that where there is 
limited information the ability to control or adapt is compromised. By exten-
sion it can be argued that where information about the external environment 
resides in specific social structures, and is not fed into an organization, the 
ability to control is correspondingly compromised. It is the paradox that results 
from an organizational desire to respond to external conditions through top-
down control leading to the acquisition and retention of information about the 
environment at operational levels that forms the basis of the following discus-
sion. 
Any top management, as part of its survival strategy, has a duty to set out 
high level objectives and ethics within a Logically Coherent Culture 
(ARCHER, 1996) which is designed to encompass all aspects of the company’s 
vision for itself. However, organizational mission statements developed by 
those following a planned approach to strategy are often dismissed as meaning-
less or disreputable (EDEN & ACKERMAN, 1998) because they appear am-
biguous and fail to translate into a framework for action. They appear like 
proverbs for general consumption, the motherhood and apple pie of manage-
ment. While the Planning School has been criticized for an overly controlling 
approach to strategic planning, resulting in a lack of learning, there has been an 
increasing acceptance of the need for strategies to emerge, or form, as well as 
be formulated (MINTZBERG, 1990; MINTZBERG, AHLSTRAND & LAM-
PEI, 1998). Emergence in this context is interpreted as the interaction of phe-
nomena generating something that is qualitatively new and cannot be decon-
structed into its constituent parts (LEMON & JEFFREY, 1998). Where the 
organizational culture does not recognize this characteristic as part of its plan-
ning it is unlikely to learn about the environment with which it interacts and 
within which it operates. Of course this has to be aligned with more structured 
procedures for acquiring that information, and through communication, assimi-
lating it as the basis for both strategic adaptation and operational action 
(knowledge). 
The need to incorporate an acceptance of emergence into a Logically Coher-
ent Culture is particularly important among the different socio-cultural group-
ings that exist across and between management and operational levels (CRAIG 
& LEMON, 2008). Concurrently, actors from the different social groups inter-
act and restructure both with each other and with their environment i.e. that 
which lies outside. This structural coupling (LEYDESDORFF, 2000) may 
occur between social systems within an organization, both laterally and hierar-
chically, but also independently between those systems and their environment 
(GREN & ZIERHOFER, 2003). By extension LUHMANN’s definition of 
communication as the unity of information, message and understanding (LEY-
DESDORFF, 2000, 2003) would allow for potentially conflicting outcomes in 
which the communication within a coherent culture is transmitted and under-
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stood while supporting action that is inconsistent with the high level intentions 
behind the message; pathological autopoiesis (GREGORY, 2006). 
The purpose of this conceptual paper will be to explore how some of the in-
sights into social systems inspired by the work of Niklas LUHMANN might 
contribute to an explanation of how and why consensual high level objectives 
can, following specific intervention strategies, result in an operational restruc-
turing that reduces rather than enhances the resilience of that organization. 
Work undertaken by the authors into the attainment of environmental manage-
ment systems and standards (CRAIG & LEMON, 2008), sustainable schools 
(LEMON, CHARNLEY & WRIGHT, 2010), product service systems (COOK, 
BHAMRA & LEMON, 2006) and telecommunications (LEMON & SAHOTA, 
2004) provide examples of the potential for strategies, often operationalized 
through the pursuit of targets and associated measures, to have counter-
productive outcomes. This paper will focus primarily upon how the social 
systems literature can help make sense of this phenomenon and will draw upon 
a case study from within the telecommunications sector to provide some exem-
plar data. 
The case study context will be briefly introduced in Section 2; subsequent 
sections will then integrate examples from the case with theoretical discussion 
in support of a number of propositions. The final section of the paper will pull 
this discussion together in terms of both organizational resilience or adaptive 
capability and the potential contribution to this understanding made by 
LUHMANN and commentators on his work. Some additional methodological 
observations will be made about researching complex organizational phenom-
ena. 
2. Case Context and Methodology 
As discussed above the counterproductive potential of top-down strategies, 
particularly when manifest through the pursuit of targets, can be observed in 
many contexts (e.g. education – the pursuit by schools of qualifications com-
promising effective learning; policing – the attainment of arrests compromising 
the reduction of crime and fear of crime; health – the turnover of patients com-
promising patient care). While the purpose of this paper is primarily to explore 
the potential of theory to help make sense of such processes the discussion will 
draw on case study research undertaken with field engineers engaged in cus-
tomer service within a large UK based telecommunications company. 
A number of strategic initiatives were introduced by the case study organi-
zation in the early 2000’s to facilitate a more autonomous technical workforce 
in the field. These included the introduction of lap-top computers for job allo-
cation, description and logistical information and the encouragement of work-
ing from home rather than out of local centers. Alongside these measures field 
engineers were expected to work alone rather than in pairs. The strategic ra-
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tionale behind the move towards autonomy and the “effective” deployment of 
the field force was to provide a more responsive and better quality service to 
the customer. Concern was expressed among some of the organization’s inter-
nal research groups, responsible for exploring customer satisfaction within the 
company, that these changes were having an adverse effect upon the level of 
service provided and were becoming a source of demotivation among the field 
engineers. 
In order to investigate whether this was the case a mixed method approach 
was undertaken. This consisted of firstly, semi-structured interviews with 
members of the field engineering and customer service research team. These 
interviews, which took place over a three month visiting fellowship for the lead 
author, explored the changes that were being introduced, the rationale behind 
them, the mechanisms for their introduction and the perceived impact that they 
were having. Additional interviews were also carried out with field engineers 
and their line managers in their depot in the South East of England and while 
accompanying them on their rounds over several days. The purpose of the 
interviews was to establish how the ongoing and proposed changes were per-
ceived by the engineers and what impact they felt they would have on the de-
livery of their service to customers. These perceptions were compared with the 
views of the customer service research team and the documented organizational 
rationale. A further day was spent in the call center responsible for the region 
eliciting how the relationships between operators, engineers and their supervi-
sory staff had been affected by the changes. 
In general terms these visits and the accompanying interviews were intended 
to provide an in-depth understanding about the factors constraining or facilitat-
ing effective customer service from the perspective of the technicians and their 
managers. The more specific interests of the research focused on how the poli-
cies had affected the social inter-action and information exchange between the 
field engineers, the motivation of the engineers and the changing nature of trust 
within, and between, organizational roles. The influence of these factors on the 
level of customer service, and the potential for the changes to have counterpro-
ductive outcomes, will provide a background example to the core conceptual 
theme of this paper. To explore how social systems thinking might help us 
understand why top down interventions can constrain the ability of an organi-
zation to learn about, and respond to, its external environment; a key feature of 
an adaptive and resilient system. 
2.1 Learning at the Customer Interface: 
Communication and Motivation  
Few operational employees would distance themselves from the sentiments in 
the following company statement or indeed from many of its’ “values” and 
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principles: We put our customers first; we are professional; we respect each 
other; we work as one team and we are committed to continuous improvement. 
The jump from such principles to operations is considerable with one being 
abstract and general and the other specific and contextual. The process is medi-
ated through the setting of goals and the formulation of strategy with its associ-
ated rules and procedures. Responses to these interventions (e.g. independent 
rather than pair based working) are incorporated into the following text. This is 
intended to help explain the relevance of, and reasons for, specific operational 
activities and perceptions. It will also exemplify where and how they might run 
counter to the intentions of the strategies that were introduced to facilitate the 
improved effectiveness of field operations – the installation and maintenance of 
domestic and business based telecommunications. 
Many of the rules, procedures and measures such as key performance indi-
cators that are normally introduced to improve efficiency have a direct impact 
upon, and may even be targeted at, the social interaction within a workforce 
and thereby their ability to communicate and inform on both technical and 
customer satisfaction issues (IRONS, 1997). In this context LUHMANN ar-
gued that not only are systems determined by their interaction with the external 
environment but components of that system would have their own independent 
interactions with that environment (BAILEY, 2005; GREN & ZIERHOFER, 
2003). 
While companies frequently try to manage how information is communi-
cated through formal mechanisms such as training and the structuring of inter-
nal social interaction (team meetings etc.) information can also be transferred 
through informal and self-organized social interaction. The following quotes by 
field engineers are indicative of the potential value of, and limitations to, the 
information that could be communicated through this type of formal and in-
formal social interaction. In the former quote the transfer of explicit knowledge 
through informal mechanisms is recognized and might refer to technical guid-
ance or geographical information or insight about customer characteristics. 
Equally of course the interaction may focus solely on conversations unrelated 
to work or criticism of the company and the formulation of strategies to un-
dermine its procedures. 
We used to meet in the café more often. If one of us had difficulty with a job 
then one of the others, who had the necessary knowledge, would usually help. 
(experienced field engineer)  
Team meetings occur once a month and get two-thirds attendance. They usu-
ally contain one-way dissemination of information. (new field engineer) 
With regard to the latter quote the team meetings did provide an opportunity 
for informal social interaction among the field engineers even if there was 
limited opportunity for “feeding back” experience from the field into the or-
ganization. It was noted that the engineers were the only people to have direct 
contact with customers, all other “communication” tended to go through call 
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centers. Despite skepticism about the value of such meetings, there remained 
some concern about the perceived decrease in importance that was attached to 
them by the organization as it sought to encourage more autonomous working 
practices. Attempts to make field engineers more independent were aligned 
with the intention to increase their productive effectiveness. This was related to 
new, time dependent, productivity measures and meant that the technicians or 
engineers were more mobile and not patch based. A field manager noted a 
similar phenomenon with regard to his own role:  
We get moved around a lot so we don’t really know the technicians or the ar-
eas that we are dealing with. I nearly sent one man into a place called (...) until 
I was told that they regularly set fire to equipment there and it is usual to send 
two men. (field manager, supervisor) 
As discussed above, these changes had a perceived impact upon the ability of 
the workforce to share information. It was also felt to affect the way individual 
jobs were undertaken, by reducing flexibility and ironically the necessary 
autonomy to be flexible. This indicates the complicated relationship between 
autonomy and level of control (DEGELE, 2008). Autonomy can be interpreted 
as working alone under well-defined rules and procedures. Alternatively it can 
be taken to mean the willingness and ability to modify rules and procedures as 
and when it is appropriate.  
We often put in higher specification equipment to help the next technician. 
The field manager is not happy but in the long run it will save time. (experi-
enced field engineer).  
Home starts are good for the company because they save time but they are not 
good for team working. When field engineers cannot complete jobs, they lose 
the productivity. They are not encouraged to be good team players. (member 
of the customer service research team)  
The issue of team working and team building is contrasted with individualistic 
working practices through the flexibility that can be incorporated into local 
teams by mixing or balancing different skills sets. This reduction in interface 
opportunities and the related opportunity for reflexive interaction inevitably 
reduces the learning and adaptive capability of local actors (LUHMANN, 
1995). Indeed if, as LUHMANN proposes, society is communication and deci-
sions rely on communication, decisions in the field will also be less adaptive 
and by extension constrain the organization’s ability to learn (DAFT & 
HUBER, 1987). 
Proposition 1: Rules and policies that limit the informal interaction among 
personnel also reduce the exchange of information that can facilitate adaptive 
responses.  
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2.2 Working as a Team – Where are the Boundaries?  
The introduction of changes that restrict the levels of interaction between field 
engineers have been seen to affect the potential of the organization to learn 
about its environment. They also reduced the opportunity of the engineers to 
self-organize in response to specific environmental conditions. Issues arose 
about how the transfer of explicit and tacit knowledge (NONAKA & TAKEU-
CHI, 1995; LAM, 2000; LEMON & SAHOTA, 2004) affected the ability of 
the engineers to function as teams. By working alone, rather than in pairs the 
potential for mentoring inexperienced by experienced engineers was compro-
mised, although it was reflected in more extensive formal training. This high-
lighted a focus on explicit rather than tacit knowledge. It also resulted in a 
failure to transfer information between the, often younger, newcomers with 
extensive technological knowledge, acquired through this training, and the 
more experienced engineers who only engaged with such innovations intermit-
tently. 
One aspect of a flexible, if not necessarily reflexive, team was seen as a mix 
of generalist and specialist skills; this raised two specific concerns. Firstly, 
under certain performance criteria, particularly those that are influenced by the 
time spent on a job, the technical specialist could be allocated the complicated 
tasks that are time-consuming. This can make it difficult for them to meet their 
targets if such tasks are not allocated separate standard times.  
The best engineers have the lowest productivity because they get the most dif-
ficult jobs – they get penalized for this and this causes resentment. (member of 
the customer service research team) 
The focus on time, combined with the reduced interaction between engineers 
also meant that there were no mechanisms for the sharing of expertise associ-
ated with a particular problem in time and place. In addition the development 
of a generic heuristic from a range of similar problems was also constrained. 
Secondly, multi-skilled personnel were often (self) perceived to be poorly 
rewarded, particularly when their “unrecognized by management” skills relate 
to defusing negative situations, supporting distressed customers or engaging 
with them to obtain and diffuse information.  
Multi-skilled people are not rewarded ... they should be because they are leav-
ing to go up to non-operational positions. (field manager, supervisor) 
These perceptions raise a fundamental question about the need to respond to, 
and meet, productivity targets that may result in the emergence of behaviors 
that run counter to one of the underlying corporate principles, namely the pur-
suit of customer satisfaction. The vision of the company operating as a team, 
therefore, often contrasts with the perception of some of the functional relation-
ships or social systems that have been introduced into the customer service 
process. This extends into the following example where the information pro-
vided to field engineers was perceived to be inadequate.  
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There is a barrier ... the front (call center) and back (field engineers) – end 
need to be put more directly in contact with each other. The front end is often 
hostile and misunderstands the requirements of the technicians in the field. 
There is a need for sales, control and technicians to experience other roles. 
(member of the customer service research team) 
The rules and procedures pursued by the call center operatives often meant that 
the information collected from the customer was not seen to match the re-
quirements of the field engineer. It follows that these rules and procedures, 
formal or informal, did not match the needs in the field nor of the company in 
general. This implies that the company strategy was ill-conceived or ill-
implemented and call center training was inadequate. 
While these statements describe an operational disparity they do not address 
some of the key factors that underpin the problem. For example, the resulting 
“inwardness” that results from productivity measures tied to a specific role 
rather than to addressing how that role fits within, and benefits, the overall 
process; ironically incorporated under the high level aim of customer satisfac-
tion. There was also a perception among the field personnel that customers 
were not provided with adequate information and this often resulted in difficult 
situations. For example the term estimated time to repair was often interpreted 
by the customer as a completion time, whereas it signified the potential time of 
arrival. Where customers had made alternative arrangements based upon their 
expectation of completion, they would often be frustrated at what is perceived 
as a delayed start, let alone finish, to the job. This was seen by the engineers or 
technicians not only as a failure to inform the customer but also to understand 
the role of the technician and the skills required to deal with social as well as 
technical difficulties. Each of the previous examples suggest that the successful 
communication of “appropriate” information between roles operating on the 
same level (sales and technicians), and from the top down and bottom up, is 
indicative of the need to be more aware of how those roles fit in to the bigger 
picture (WEBB, LETTICE & LEMON, 2006; COLEY & LEMON, 2008). 
Indeed one of the roles claimed for matrix management (DE LAAT, 1994) is to 
ensure that all elements of the agency side of management from design through 
to field engineers can call upon all the resources within those organizational 
elements. 
Proposition 2: It is essential that the procedures and performance measures 
attached to one part of a linked process do not lead to behaviors that restrict 
capability elsewhere. Where performance measures are used they must be in 
the context of the whole process – and take account of the operating environ-
ment. 
The previous two sections have highlighted the need to obtain, filter and 
process information about the environment as the basis for adaptive behavior. 
What this also suggests is that the nature of the task (field engineering) is modi-
fied alongside and interactively with changing internal relationships, (among 
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engineers) and the nature of information that is communicated between them 
and with other actors in customer service provision (e.g. customers, line man-
agement, call centers). This reproduction will inevitably change the boundaries 
between the field engineers and their environment – i.e. other engineers may 
now be “outside” and thereby part of the environment. This in turn raises ques-
tions about how flexible the new structures are in terms of meeting their high 
level aims (efficient service, customer satisfaction) and related to that the level 
and type of trust that might exist in order to facilitate, or hinder, those efforts. 
2.3 Trust and Flexibility 
One of the features of introducing change into an organization is that it encour-
ages people away from the familiar and in so doing may serve to disrupt habit-
ual behaviors, positive or negative (MARECHAL, 2009). Niklas LUHMANN 
(2000) differentiates familiarity from trust through the introduction of risk and 
the possibility that the outcome of a decision may result in greater damage than 
benefit. This is an ironic distinction in the context of the current discussion 
where the outcome of a policy decision may result in behaviors and the re-
structuring of social relations that are not necessarily to the benefit of the or-
ganization; the pathological autopoiesis discussed by GREGORY (2006).  
The reduction of social interaction between technicians inevitably affects the 
potential for “companion” or relationship trust (NEWELL & SWAN, 2000) 
that is grounded in a personal bond with an individual or social group and 
restricts the adaptivity that can result from such close relationships e.g. infor-
mation sharing, help with difficult jobs and the limitation of bad practice: “Be-
cause he works from home we never really benefit from his knowledge on the 
job” (member of the customer research team). 
Equally of course such trust can reinforce the emergence of behaviors and 
associated social systems that support poor practice or indeed behaviors that 
are to the disadvantage of the organization while being beneficial to certain 
sub-groupings within it (e.g. free-loading, stealing of materials from site). 
MARS (1994) suggests that this requires the existence of a stronger attachment 
to, or fear of, a sub culture or social system than that which exists to the or-
ganization as a whole. Such behavior can of course become institutionalized 
when the organization finds it easier, for social and or economic reasons, to 
accept such behavior than to address it. The generation and perpetuation of 
such “pathological” sub groups can also be sustained by the re-drawing of 
boundary conditions such that the organization constitutes the external envi-
ronment that the group has to manage and respond to. This phenomenon may 
also result in behaviors that can be beneficial to the organization but not antici-
pated by it. One example of this is where groups of field engineers agree to put 
in higher specification equipment to reduce problems in the future. This relies 
either on the personal trust of line managers and the competence of the techni-
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cian or the collective agreement among the field engineers to operate in a way 
that is not sanctioned by the organization. 
While much of the focus on trust in an organizational context is attributed to 
competence, of procedures, technology and people (BURNS & FLAM, 1990; 
NEWELL & SWAN, 2000), LEANA and VAN BUREN (2000) argue that it 
binds employers and employees together as well as employees to one another 
and creates value by facilitating successful collective action. In an earlier paper 
LEANA and VEN BUREN (1999) highlight two components of this social 
capital as associability and trust where trust can be fragile and based on risk 
and reward calculations. Within this arena there is the specific trust between 
co-workers and a generalized trust that the company is “treating them right”; in 
the case study presented here the first was prevailing, although not always 
across operational roles (e.g. engineers and call center operatives) but the sec-
ond was under severe stress affecting top management, operational agency and 
customer alike. 
Evidence of a pervasive distrust has been the emergence of operational 
(field engineers) concerns relating to perceptions of competence. Competence 
trust in this context appears to have more to do with the perceived relevance 
and effectiveness of the procedures that people are expected to follow than to 
the skill of the individuals themselves. The engineers argued that the informa-
tion collected and distributed by call centers was determined by the center’s 
targets and not the requirements in the field. This concern was reinforced by 
the “rationalization” of those centers to regional hubs that could be a consider-
able distance from a field engineers’ “patch” with the result that there was no 
guarantee of the necessary “local” knowledge being used to support the alloca-
tion of jobs to the engineers or information to the customer. 
As discussed above, the move towards individual working practices was ac-
companied by a perceived reduction in the amount of training that experienced 
technicians received and led to concern over the acquisition and updating of 
core competencies, and the potential danger that customers will have a reduced 
level of trust in operational capability. This competence based trust (NEWELL 
& SWAN, 2000) is as closely related to the processes that affect the way in 
which skills and information are specified and acquired (e.g. training proce-
dures relating to customer interaction) as to deficiencies in either (e.g. not 
possessing specific skills). The latter is perceived as a symptom rather than a 
cause of problems that are ultimately seen to affect customer relations. 
The perceived need by some engineers/technicians to focus on customer sat-
isfaction rather than performance productivity coincided with the perception 
that the customer tends to get ignored because the technician is in a hurry. 
Concerns over the appropriateness of information, and the “breadth” of training 
were seen to compound the operational constraints that were felt to result from 
an undue emphasis upon meeting performance targets. Indeed the ability to step 
outside of accepted procedures in an appropriate way would be enhanced by 
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relevant information and diverse skills, including the preparedness to take 
considered risks – e.g. to spend time with a customer who may be interested in 
purchasing additional services. 
Confidence in the judgment that underpins such a decision highlights a mix 
of competence and relationship trust between the line manager and the field 
engineer. The competence associated with making an informed decision lead-
ing to behavior that is outside of standard procedures, and the support for that 
decision, relates as much to the existence of trust as a principle, that should not 
be abused, as it does to the ability to think and operate outside of a prescribed 
norm,. It is unlikely that such a decision would be taken without some confi-
dence that no penalty would ensue or that the skills (technical or social) existed 
to support the subsequent activity. Where these conditions do not exist the 
potential damage may indeed be greater than the benefits incurred but may also 
relate as much to the relationship between field engineer and line manager as 
between customer and organization. 
Proposition 3: The freedom to act outside of a rule/role boundary requires 
reciprocated trust. 
2.4 Customer Satisfaction Versus Productivity  
As outlined above, field engineers undertake the majority of face-to-face inter-
action with the customer and a key component of an organization’s ability to 
respond to its operating environment is the competence and persona of its engi-
neers to undertake this task effectively. While many of the engineers felt that 
this was a fundamental aspect of their role there was also a perception that the 
organization failed to recognize its importance. This was expressed through a 
lack of training about customer interface and inadequate mechanisms for feed-
ing information from, and about, customers back into the system. Productivity 
measures were not perceived to account for the inter-personal environment that 
can affect the course of a job and the subsequent perception of the company by 
the customer.  
Field engineers are deemed to be sufficiently skilled if they can install a ser-
vice even though they may be unable explain it to the customer. (experienced 
field engineer) 
The willingness of many engineers to engage with the customer was seen as an 
expression of commitment and a motivating factor in their work. It also high-
lighted a key paradox in their role. Performance measures and targets are pro-
ductivity driven, whereas “personal” measures often coincide with the underly-
ing principles associated with customer satisfaction. This leads to a tension 
between one set of principle-based measures that are motivational and another 
set of productivity measures that can have a de-motivating effect if not properly 
designed. 
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The importance that is attached to social skills and customer satisfaction by 
some engineers is an example of where underlying principles can be seen to 
transcend personal boundaries (ASHFORTH, KREINER & FUGATE, 2000). 
In other words they are pertinent to all aspects of life, including that of being a 
customer. The potential for conflict and demotivation arises from a failure of 
an organization to value soft skills. 
MIRCHANDANI (1998) discusses the problems that highly trained tele-
commuters experience in gaining acceptance for the “soft” domestic roles that 
inevitably intrude into their home working. A similar situation appeared to be 
in evidence with the limited recognition of “soft skills” in the customer service 
workplace. By focusing on the technological aspects of the field technician / 
engineer’s role management may have been in pursuit of a less effective strat-
egy for achieving customer satisfaction than if they had recognized the vari-
ability of that role and the skills required to undertake it. 
Proposition 4: In order to respond to the uncertainties of their operating en-
vironment organizations must recognize, and nurture, the social capabilities of 
their technical personnel. 
3. Discussion and Conclusions  
This short paper has suggested that social systems theoretical approaches can 
help explain a phenomenon observed by each of the author’s in different con-
texts – the potential for top down, target and measure oriented strategies to 
have counterproductive operational outcomes. It has been argued that while 
high level organizational ambitions such as improving the efficiency of local 
service delivery and enhanced customer satisfaction are likely to receive gen-
eral support throughout an organization their translation into operations can 
result in behaviors that negate the very purpose for which they were intro-
duced. One suggested reason for this is that when change is introduced from 
the top down, without adequate attention being paid to how it might lead to a 
re-structuring at lower organizational levels of social interaction, there is a 
danger that information about the external environment will be restricted. This 
may occur in part through changes in the relationships between operational 
personnel and in part as a result of the information that is acquired by those 
personnel about customer needs and experiences. Some strategic aims can 
therefore be devalued by a failure to recognize important organizing, and often 
moral, principles for the operational personnel engaged in the pursuit of cus-
tomer satisfaction (IRONS, 1997). For example, one cause of this dissatisfac-
tion for the case study field engineers was an apparent management failure to 
recognize the extent of the role that is played by them, in particular with regard 
to their social interaction with customers. 
In effect, the operationalization of high level aims can lead an organization 
to “turn in on itself,” prioritizing compliance with its own procedures and 
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measures and in so doing compromising the quality of the interface with its 
environment. Information about the environment and the assimilation of that, 
through communication, into the organization is, it has been argued, fundamen-
tal to the resilience and adaptive capability of that organization. It means that 
the organization may not be able to reflect, or respond to, the complexity of the 
environment within which, and with which, it is operating and interacting 
(ASHBY, 1958; GREGORY, 2006). 
This inward focus may be linked to internal restructuring in which opera-
tional actors respond to their perception of how the organization expects them 
to act. A response that may of course also include the willingness and ability to 
circumvent those expectations in a bid to align with personal and collective 
intentions that are not consistent with the organization’s high level ambitions 
and the associated rules and systems to meet them (MARS, 1994). Indeed the 
ability of operational staff to acquire information about the organizational 
environment may mean that they are better equipped to function in an adaptive 
and self-producing manner (LUHMANN, 2000). This may occur through the 
interaction between the operational social system and the organizational envi-
ronment (e.g. responding to the market and customer requirements) and the 
potential for “pathological” autopoiesis where insight may support behaviors 
that benefit the operational staff concerned but not the organization as a whole. 
This raises an interesting question about whether the field engineers in the case 
study, and operational staff more generally, might re-structure in such a way 
that the organization becomes their environment. This extends the observations 
of MARS (1994) and BAILEY (2005) that sub-cultures or internal system 
components interact with the environment both independently and as part of 
the organization. 
Of course, a single case study can only provide limited supporting evidence 
for what is essentially a theoretical argument. It is hoped, however, that in 
combination they will stimulate research activity in other organizational con-
texts where change directs attention away from acquiring and assimilating 
information about the environment and towards the entrenchment of internal 
capabilities (LEMON & SAHOTA, 2004). 
In light of this special issue the paper suggests a number of methodological 
points for consideration. Firstly, the restructuring in response to top-down 
interventions results in emergent and, by implication, irreversible (DEGELE, 
2008) changes. Such changes occur both in terms of the (sub)systems under 
study and the environment with which they are interacting. The methodology 
employed must be able to reflect that complexity. This highlights the value of 
longitudinal studies and raises questions about how we observe emergent phe-
nomena when such an approach is not feasible – e.g. for reasons of timing or 
resources. It also suggests the need to access actors at each level of the system 
under observation and to draw upon theoretical insight to help interpret how 
they perceive the process(es) of change being explored (LEYDESDORFF, 
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2003). These actors are also observers, who are responding to transformations 
as they see them, and in so doing form part of that transformation (MATHUR, 
2008). In this sense organizational research inevitably has a “second order” 
observational component to it. 
A final methodological point relates to the dangers of an anthropocentric 
approach to organizational studies. A key feature of complex systems is the 
interconnectivity of agents. The need to map out the social interactions between 
human actors is therefore very important as is an understanding of the way they 
individually, collectively and dynamically observe and make sense of their 
situation. While that situation may be socially constructed it is not constructed 
only of social actors. Our methodologies have to account for the technologies, 
economics, natural environment etc. which on the one hand provide the “objec-
tive” component of Karl WEICK’s (1976) “loose coupling” while on the other 
interact to constitute complex systems. There is a need to systematically de-
velop methodological and theoretical approaches that recognize all people as 
“potential” actors while accepting that not all actors are people (LAW, 2004). 
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